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Chapter 1
Introduction
A New Global Order
On 21 February 1939, a few months after British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain travelled to Munich in an attempt to appease Adolf Hitler, 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London held a panel dis-
cussion about world order. The main speaker, Lionel Curtis, argued that 
interdependency was the main characteristic of the modern world: ‘What 
one small country, a Serbia or a Czechoslovakia, does or leaves undone 
instantly affects the whole of human society’. He added that in spite of 
the fact that ‘socially and economically human society is now one closely 
integrated unit’, the political order reflected fragmentation rather than 
unity. His conclusion was clearly stated: ‘I am now convinced that a world 
commonwealth embracing all nations and kindreds [sic] and tongues is 
the goal at which we must aim before we can hope to move to a higher 
plane of civilisation. Indeed, I will now go so far as to say that unless we 
conceive that goal in time, and take steps to approach it, our present stage 
of civilisation is doomed to collapse’.1 Curtis’s address was followed by a 
lively debate about the merits of his suggestions, which reassured him of 
the public interest in the problem of ‘world order’ and led him to convene 
a Chatham House study group on the topic.
Curtis was not the only one to find the problem of world order particu-
larly timely and intriguing. In January 1940, H. G. Wells published his own 
global vision, under the title The New World Order. Whether It Is Attainable, 
How It Can Be Attained and What Sort of World a World at Peace Will Have 
to Be.2 By then, Europe was already at war. The National Peace Council 
in London organised a panel discussion about Wells’s book, including the 
philosopher C. E. M. Joad and the Spanish diplomat Salvador de Mada­
riaga, at which the author was confronted with proponents of alternative 
1 Lionel Curtis, ‘World Order’, International Affairs 18 (1939): 301– 320. Curtis was one of the founders 
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).
2 H. G. Wells, The New World Order. Whether It Is Attainable, How It Can Be Attained and What Sort of 
World a World at Peace Will Have to Be (London: Secker and Warburg, 1940).
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visions of post­ war world order.3 In the United States, the sinologist and 
geopolitical thinker Owen Lattimore published in 1942 an article on ‘Asia 
in a New World Order’, while his friend, US Vice President Henry Wal-
lace, gave an address at Ohio Wesleyan University on the Christian foun­
dations of a new world order.4 Luigi Sturzo, Hans Kuhn, E. H. Carr, Robert M. 
Hutchins, and Quincy Wright were just some of many commentators and 
intellectuals who wrote books and delivered speeches under the title of 
‘world order’.5
Google Ngram analysis of twentieth­ century English­ language publica-
tions registers a significant rise of interest in ‘world order’ in the 1940s, 
with its frequency peaking in 1945. But the concern with the problem of 
order extended beyond references to the specific expression ‘world order’. 
The fundamental problem of ordering and reordering the world after a 
devastating conflict seemed a worthy preoccupation for many public in-
tellectuals in Britain and the United States. The destabilising war was per-
ceived not only as a menacing prospect of doom, but also as an opportu-
nity to question and redefine the fundamental categories of politics. These 
reconsiderations were often motivated by the perception of a growing 
tendency towards technological, economic, cultural, and political inter-
connectedness, which for many mid­ century thinkers gave rise to a new 
political concept, the global.
The Emergence of Globalism is an intellectual history of the complex and 
nonlinear genealogy of globalism in mid­ century visions of world order. 
Ever since the outbreak of the war, American, British, and émigré intel-
lectuals had diagnosed the emergence of globalism as the defining condi-
tion of the post­ war era. Their proposals for ordering the post­ war world 
envisaged competing schemes of global orders motivated by concerns for 
the future of democracy, the prospects of liberty and diversity, and the 
decline of the imperial system. In this book, I explore the languages em-
ployed to outline the meaning of the ‘global’ as a political idea to shed 
light on the configurations of ‘world order’ as a normative foundation for 
geopolitical, economic, and legal structures.
Mid­ century commentators, as well as later historians, have often in-
voked the term ‘world order’ when writing about international politics. 
The statistical data match the textual evidence in revealing that ever since 
3 National Peace Council, On the New World Order (London: National Peace Council, 1940).
4 Owen Lattimore, ‘Asia in a New World Order’, Foreign Policy Reports 28 (1942): 150– 163; Henry A. 
Wallace et al., Christian Bases of World Order (New York: Abingdon­ Cokesbury Press, 1943).
5 The University of Denver organised a series of lectures on world order by Robert Maynard Hutchins, 
E. H. Carr, Robert Oppenheimer, W. E. Rappard, and E. M. Earle, later published in E. L. Woodward, 
ed., Foundations of World Order (Denver: University of Denver, 1949); Quincy Wright, Human Rights and 
the World Order (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1943); Luigi Sturzo, Italy 
and the New World Order (New York: Macdonald, 1944); Hans Kohn, World Order in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942).
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the beginning of the war, public intellectuals in Britain and the United 
States have sought to imagine the shape of the world to come. The idea 
of order embodied their attempt to make sense and reorganise the bellig-
erent and disordered post­ war world.6 They hoped to overcome the po-
litical chaos that was seen as the tragic consequence of the international 
disorder, economic strife, and social unrest of the interwar years. The idea 
of order did not necessarily imply a rigid, unifying, or homogeneous sys-
tem. Rather, many conceptions of world order revolved around the aspi­
ration to accommodate change and flexibility as valuable and desirable 
aspects of human life. The tension between order and instability remained 
a central aspect of mid­ century political commentary.
The political debates about world order explored in this study exhibited 
a growing sensitivity to a particular dimension of politics that I define as 
‘global’. One of my main objectives is, therefore, to outline the competing 
meanings of the global as a political space in mid­ century thought. If we 
examine the statistical analysis of published texts in English language pro-
vided by Google, we can see that the term ‘global’ started to gain ground 
just after the outbreak of the war. It was at that moment that the new po-
litical space of the global was generated as a response to the total and all­ 
encompassing nature of the war, facilitated by technological innovations. If 
the war was global, an adequately global plan for peacetime order was nec-
essary. Thinking about the global sphere did not signify the abandonment 
of all other constituent elements of politics; states, empires, federations, 
non­ state communities, and supranational organisations were reimagined 
and redefined— but not necessarily abolished— before they could acquire a 
new place in the modern, global world. In this book, I use the term ‘global’ 
in the widest, most inclusive sense, as a perspective on politics, a sometimes 
abstract space that was modified, redefined, and challenged in lively trans-
national conversations.
The ‘global’ was invoked to outline a different political order than the 
international, transnational, and cosmopolitan spaces of politics. In the 
writings of mid­ century public intellectuals, all four categories make their 
appearance in content if not by name. As a political category, the international 
attributes importance to the nation, or the state, as a defining, order­ creating 
6 For some references to ‘world order’ in the study of international relations, see, for example, Daniele 
Archibugi and David Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 
1995); Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and 
Movements, 1880s– 1930s (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Patrick J. Hearden, Architects of Glob­
alism: Building a New World Order during World War II (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002); 
Christopher D. O’Sullivan, Sumner Welles, Post­ war Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937– 
1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard 
Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2013).
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unit, and explores the relations between nations as sovereign entities.7 
The transnational space stretches beyond national boundaries to explore 
interconnections across borders, without undermining the significance 
of national communities and states.8 Cosmopolitanism, by contrast, typ-
ically assumes that all human beings are part of a world community, and 
should orient their political and moral allegiances accordingly.9 Globalism 
emerged from an awareness of the political significance of the globe as 
a unitary whole made of interconnected, diverse political units. The rec-
ognition of the world’s ‘oneness’ did not always mean political monism. 
Glob alism often implied a renewed awareness of diversity, and an attempt 
to envisage a world order to preserve it. The tension between diversity and 
unity is, therefore, a central aspect of the idea of globalism.
The assumption that the post­ war order should reflect the spatial unity 
of the globe often relied on technological innovations like flights and tele-
phone communications, which contributed, for mid­ century commenta-
tors, to the world’s interconnectedness. One of the best­ selling books advo-
cating this view was One World, the account of the 1942 world tour of the 
American Republican politician Wendell Willkie.10 Two years after his de-
feat in the presidential race to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Willkie embarked on 
a private airplane for a goodwill tour of Egypt, Palestine, Turkey, Russia, 
Siberia, and China, meeting with leading politicians and local residents. 
His book provides colourful and enthusiastic commentary on disparate 
topics: from the beauty of Mongolia and Mount Scopus seen from the air 
to Charles de Gaulle’s Beirut home, where ‘every corner, every wall, held 
busts, statues, and pictures of Napoleon’, to an enthusiastic analysis of the 
Chinese economy. The general message was that there were no more dis-
tant or uncovered places in the world; one could easily travel to any re-
mote spot, meet its inhabitants, and discover their lifestyle and opinions. 
In consequence, for Willkie, the post­ war world order should be drafted ac-
cording to the interests of the world as a whole, not only of powerful states 
or empires. Political and economic freedom in China or the Middle East 
7 Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 
10– 12.
8 C. A. Bayly et al., ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, American Historical Review 111 (2006): 
1441– 1464.
9 There are many possible definitions of cosmopolitanism in current literature. One definition for 
Kantian cosmopolitanism is ‘an attitude taken up in acting: an attitude of recognition, respect, openness, 
interest, beneficence and concern toward other human individuals, cultures, and peoples as members of 
one global community’. See Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World 
Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1. For recent intellectual histories of interna-
tionalism and cosmopolitanism, see, for example, Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Luca Scuccimarra, I confini del mondo: Storia del 
cosmopolitismo dall’antichità al settecento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006).
10 Wendell L. Willkie, One World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943).
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was no less important than American freedom. The increasing availability 
of air power rendered, for him, the space of politics more interconnected, 
closed, and therefore ‘global’.
Thinking about the global as a material and conceptual political space 
emphasises the complexity of this idea. The ‘spatial turn’ in historical re­
search highlighted the importance of space, place, location, and spatial-
ity as categories for understanding and analysing historical knowledge.11 
The study of international thought is concerned, explicitly and implicitly, 
with the category of space. Geographic space, its perceptions and repre-
sentations, provides a fundamental and intriguing conceptual framework 
for understanding and analysing world politics. Put differently, political 
space is the theoretical conceptualisation of the geographic materiality of 
politics. Yet, as Harvey Starr suggests, scholars of International Relations 
usually ignore the notion of ‘space’, misinterpret it as deterministic, or 
dismiss it as irrelevant to their analysis.12 Starr’s proposal to take the con-
cept of ‘space’ more seriously applies also for historians of international 
thought. In this study, I argue that the category of political space offers 
a useful perspective on political thought, which is particularly appropri-
ate to delineate and locate the meanings of world order and globalism. 
I employ this category to reflect on the mid­ century perceptions of the 
physical geographic conditions of the world and their impact on political 
and social order.13 The notion of political space suggests that the inter-
pretation of the relationship between politics and geography depends on 
perception: the global was not a mere objective description of the actual 
spherical geographic conditions of planet Earth. The political space cre-
ated by the globalist ideology was anchored in observations about ge-
ography but shaped by a range of other philosophical, sociological, and 
political assumptions. This is not a unilinear relationship, but a mutual 
one: politics can influence the geographical conditions of the world, as 
well as be influenced by them.
The idea of political space provides a helpful connection between the 
concrete geopolitics of international relations and the abstract notion of 
order. It clarifies how various public intellectuals perceived the actual or-
ganisation and interaction of different political units in the world. My goal 
in using this concept is not to impose a rigid theory of political space on 
past thinkers, but rather to investigate how they characterised and theo-
rised political space in their own writings. Examining the theoretical and 
11 Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Place and the “Spatial Turn” in Geography and in History’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 70 (2009): 637– 658.
12 Harvey Starr, ‘On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places’, International Studies Quarterly 57 (2013): 433– 439.
13 Carlo Galli, Political Spaces and Global War, trans. Elisabeth Fay, ed. Adam Sitze (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 4; Leif Jerram, ‘Space: A Useless Category for Historical Analysis?’, 
History and Theory 52 (2013): 400– 419.
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material spatial dimension of political structures helps understand their 
internal functions and dispositions towards other units and towards the 
global space.
Drawing the Contours  
of Globalism
Globalism meant different things to different people. The book explores 
aspects of the 1940s discourse of globalism through seven mid­ century 
conversations about world order. Political commentators drew on various 
fields of knowledge to conceptualise the rise of the global space in world 
politics. Economics, philosophy of science, sociology, law, geopolitics, the-
ology, political thought— each provided a distinct set of tools for shaping 
the global order. The multifaceted, flexible character of the idea of the 
global enhanced its appeal but also highlighted its weakness. There was 
no one ‘global’ ideology, no single definition of the ‘global’ political sphere. 
Yet three main themes can be discerned from mid­ century attempts to con-
ceptualise globalism.
First, globalism offered an alternative to empire. The global order em-
bodied a growing acceptance of the decline of the imperial world order 
established by the European powers: France, Britain, and to a lesser extent 
the Netherlands.14 By 1945, the new empires in potentia, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan, were effectively defeated. After the war, some feared the rise 
of the United States and Soviet Russia as powerful empires controlling 
vast territories around the world. While the political experience of empire 
could not be expunged from the international public sphere, and indeed 
had significant ideological and structural influence on the institutions of 
liberal internationalism, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, 
mid­ century thinkers sought to fashion the global space as an alternative 
to imperial relations.15 Some, like Owen Lattimore and Barbara Wootton, 
expressed a clear hostility to the very idea of empire. Arguably, as Ian Hall 
suggests, many British liberal international thinkers felt the urge to re-
formulate their theories of world order in view of the decline in Britain’s 
14 On the end of empire, see, for example, John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical 
Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781– 1997 
(London: Vintage, 2008); Jacques Frémeaux, Les empires coloniaux dans le processus de mondialisation 
(Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002).
15 For example, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins 
of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: 
The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Patricia Clavin, 
Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920– 1946 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2013).
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global supremacy and the dissolution of its empire.16 Yet, as I will show, 
the rejection of empire emerged not only from observations of imperial po-
litical and military decay but also from a growing ambivalence about the 
cultural and political legacy of empire. Thus, the globalist ideology sought 
to elaborate an alternative defining principle of world order, against the 
exploitative, unequal political space of empire.
Writing about the foundations of international thought, David Armitage 
has suggested that historians should explore the international transition 
from a system of empires to the current system of states.17 This transition, 
I argue, was not linear or neat: mid­ century thinkers developed competing 
and sometimes incompatible visions to accommodate not only states and 
empires in the world system, but also federations, regional unions, trans-
national communities, and international organisations. The space between 
empires and states was complex, multilayered, and at times incoherent. 
Political thinkers have long been engaged in assessing the political legacy 
of empire, and questioning the place of liberty therein.18 In the interwar 
years, both imperial and anti­ imperial dynamics inspired British thinkers 
to imagine a new international order.19 As Jeanne Morefield has shown, 
by relying on the imperial experience to construct a new world order, in­
terwar liberal internationalists failed to overcome the repressive and ex-
clusive aspects of the imperial mind­ set.20 By the 1940s, however, many 
16 Ian Hall, Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945– 1975 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2012).
17 David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 12– 20.
18 On the relations between international order and imperialism, see, for example, Jennifer Pitts, 
A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2005); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth­ Century British Liberal 
Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Sankar Muhtu, ‘Adam Smith’s Critique of Inter-
national Trading Companies: Theorizing “Globalization” in the Age of Enlightenment’, Political Theory 
36 (2008): 185– 212; Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the 
Future of World Order, 1860– 1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Duncan Bell, ed., 
Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth­ Century Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
19 On the rise of interwar liberal internationalism, see, for example, Daniel Laqua, ed., Internationalism 
Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Dan-
iel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Michael Pugh, Liberal Internationalism: The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 2012); Louis Bisceglia, Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism in Britain, 1931– 1935 (New York: 
Garland, 1982); Inderjeet Parmar, ‘Anglo­ American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in 
the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations’, International Relations 16 
(2002): 53– 75; Cornelia Navari, Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 
2000).
20 Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). For other accounts of interwar critiques of empire, see David Long, 
Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J. A. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire (London: Macmillan, 1968); Nicholas Owen, The 
British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti­ imperialism, 1885– 1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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argued that the damages created by the imperial order outnumbered its 
benefits.
The second constitutive element of the global ideologies was a concern 
for the future of democracy. During and after the war, it was difficult to 
predict the long­ term survival of democracy as a political system; domestic 
and international threats loomed large.21 The global perspective on the fu-
ture of democracy relied on regional, transnational, federal, or global insti-
tutions, rather than on the basic unit of the territorial state. For some mid­ 
century commentators, democracy could not function well if limited to the 
domestic realm: a new conception of global democratic order that tran-
scended the boundaries of the state was necessary. This required recon-
ceptualising the basic values commonly associated with democracy: equal-
ity, inclusion in the political community, political participation, and— the 
greatest challenge for the ideologues of globalism— a new global political 
subject.22
Democracy was central to American and British efforts of post­ war plan­
ning and reconstruction, which configured the world order discourse in in-
stitutional and private political debate.23 Wartime Chatham House– based 
committees on world order and reconstruction united prominent British 
thinkers on international relations to discuss a post­ war internationalist 
and democratic order.24 After the war against totalitarianism was won, 
deliberations in the United Nations aimed at refashioning democracy for 
the post­ war era.25 While many shared the conviction that democracy was 
the best political system to foster liberty and prosperity, efforts were made 
to reinforce its stability and enhance its flexibility to adapt to diverse so-
cial and economic conditions. No one model of democracy was deemed 
fit for all. The challenge of creating a pluralist yet coherent global demo-
cratic order, of globalising its political culture and institutions, required a 
new conception of modernity. For some mid­ century thinkers, the solution 
would be to draw on a wider range of sources that represented the unify-
21 On the crisis of democracy after the war, see David Runciman, The Confidence Trap (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), chap. 3; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scien­
tific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973).
22 Jan­ Werner Müller explored the multifaceted democratic discourse in twentieth­ century European 
history, without dedicating attention to the place of democracy in the globalist discourse. See Contesting 
Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth­ Century Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).
23 On American post­ war planning, see Hearden, Architects of Globalism; Stephen A. Wertheim, ‘To-
morrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World War II’ (PhD dissertation, Columbia 
University, 2015). On American post­ war planning regarding Britain and the dominions, see Andrew 
Baker, Constructing a Post­ war Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2011).
24 On the American and British post­ war planners and the role of Chatham House, see Andrew J. Wil-
liams, Failed Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998), 126– 140.
25 Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 79– 80.
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ing elements of humanity. The conceptual toolbox of modern global de­
mocracy included not only rationality and scientific progress but also mo­
rality, faith, myth, and religion, which attained an increasingly greater im­
portance for mid­ century planners of world order.
The attempts to come up with new interpretations of democracy for the 
global age were later castigated by historians as ‘a failure’ since most ideas 
received no practical application.26 However, anachronistic and hindsight 
judgments run the risk of obscuring the issues that past commen tators were 
concerned with. My main aim, therefore, is not to investigate if and how 
these global schemes were actualised, but to uncover the political terms 
and conceptual vocabulary employed to promote certain ideas about pol-
itics in historical context. The approach I adopt focuses on examining the 
aims behind international theories to discern their meaning at the time and 
their implications for later conceptions of world order. Thus, I argue that 
mid­ century interpretations of democracy beyond the state can provide in­
sights on the intellectual origins of the globalist discourse even if the con-
crete political visions they proposed— such as a world democratic federa-
tion or a regional union— were not realised.
Third, globalism was anchored, for mid­ century thinkers, in a plural-
istic conception of world order.27 Many of the intellectuals I discuss here 
argued that the post­ war global order should reflect the political, cultural, 
and social pluralism that they had diagnosed in their world. The existing 
condition of political and moral diversity should, they suggested, acquire 
a normative expression in the new global order. Inspired by the British 
pluralists, especially Harold Laski and Lord Acton, these thinkers explored 
the potential implications of pluralism on political order in the global, 
rather than domestic sphere.28
Arguably, there is more than one way to define and interpret pluralism 
in the history of political thought. For Avigail Eisenberg, pluralism goes 
beyond mere freedom of association: ‘Political pluralism are theories that 
seek to organize and conceptualize political phenomena on the basis of the 
plurality of groups to which individuals belong and by which individuals 
26 On visions of global order as (at least partially) a failure, see, for example, Wesley T. Wooley, Alter­
natives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism since World War II (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1988) 40– 65; Williams, Failed Imagination?; Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea 
(London: Allen Lane, 2012), 284– 290; Jo­ Anne Pemberton, Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for 
One World (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 115– 166.
27 On Anglo­ American pluralism in the twentieth century, see Mark Bevir, ed., Modern Pluralism: 
Anglo­ American Debates since 1880 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Marc Stears, Progres­
sives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1909– 1926 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
28 For the history of pluralism as a political idea in the context of the state, see David Runciman, Plu­
ralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Nicholls, The 
Pluralist State: The Political Ideas of J. N. Figgis and His Contemporaries (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975).
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seek to advance, and more importantly, to develop, their interests’.29 In 
this book, I adopt an inclusive definition of pluralism to propose that mid­ 
century political commentators and public intellectuals employed this 
term to suggest that states could not claim sole authority over individuals. 
Other associations, groups, and organisations provided individuals— and 
‘persons’— with important opportunities to interact and construct political 
spaces to advance their political, social, and cultural interests. Pluralism 
was not a source of political and social chaos, but a form of global order. 
Nonetheless, these thinkers did not always distinguish clearly between 
value pluralism and political pluralism, between pluralism of acceptable 
moral views and pluralism of political institutions governing the commu-
nity. The opacity of the term ‘pluralism’ contributed to its rhetorical effi-
cacy, but undermined its analytical power in the globalist discourse.
The attention to pluralism as a key factor in the globalist agenda does not 
imply making a case for the inclusion of all these figures in the pluralist 
tradition of political thought. However, in view of recent interest in the 
political theory of pluralism, I suggest that looking back at the 1940s at-
tempts to deploy the vocabulary of pluralism within the globalist discourse 
can reveal the limits of conceptualising a pluralist world order.30 There 
were evident tensions between the pluralistic approach and the support for 
democracy as the preferable form of government. It was difficult to valo-
rise non­ Western forms of political order and insist that the Western inter-
pretation of humanity embodied a universal truth.31 By consequence, the 
proponents of the globalist discourse struggled to reconcile the universal-
ising and the pluralistic aspects of their visions of world order, which thus 
collapsed sometimes into a defence of Western moral and political values.
The Mid­ century Discourse of Globalism
The time frame of this study is the decade between the outbreaks of two 
wars: World War II and the Korean War. It is a recurrent claim that ‘we 
still live in the shadow of the most dramatic and decisive decade of the 
29 Avigail I. Eisenberg, Reconstructing Political Pluralism (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1995), 2.
30 For recent analytical accounts of pluralism as a philosophical position, see Victor Muñiz­ Fraticelli, 
The Structure of Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: 
The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).
31 Jacob T. Levy identified a similar tension between pluralism and rationalistic universalism in the 
history of liberal thought. See Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014).
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twentieth century’.32 Over the course of the decade, the European powers 
were starting to lose grip on their empires, while new voices in the Amer-
ican public debate called for greater intervention in world politics.33 The 
war years and their immediate aftermath represent a significant moment 
of world crisis, understood in terms of change and transition, if not de-
cisive innovation. Allied political leaders established governmental think 
tanks to envisage the post­ war settlement and reconstruction on domestic 
and global scales.34 After the war, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid 
led to a stronger American presence in Europe. The redefined spatiality of 
the Atlantic region was sanctified in legal agreements through the Atlan-
tic Charter of 1941 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which estab-
lished a closer American­ British cooperation, highlighting the shift from 
the old to the new imperial power.35
New experiments in international organisations brought about the Char-
ter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), both influential efforts to redefine international and trans-
national relations on a global scale.36 In 1945, delegates of fifty states gath-
ered in San Francisco to agree upon the Charter of the United Nations. 
The document was finalised in April and subsequently signed on 26 June 
1945.37 At the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences in 1944 and 1945, 
the Allied powers had already launched a series of discussions to create a 
long­ term post­ war settlement to guarantee international peace. The UN 
Charter built upon and expanded these earlier proposals and created a new 
international organisation, the United Nations, to ‘reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights’, establish a regime of justice based on international 
law, and ‘promote social progress’.38 The main aim of the new organisation 
was a peaceful settlement of international disputes by employing legal as 
32 David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 
1940s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.
33 John A. Thompson, ‘The Geopolitical Vision: The Myth of an Outmatched USA’, in Uncertain Empire: 
American History and the Idea of the Cold War, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 91– 114. See also Pemberton, Global Metaphors, 115; Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 
1941– 1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).
34 On post­ war reconstruction, see, for example, Reynolds, From World War to Cold War; David Reyn-
olds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 9– 30; Mark Mazower, 
Jessica Reinisch, and David Feldman, eds., Post­ war Reconstruction in Europe: International Perspectives, 
1945– 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Eu­
rope 1945– 51 (London: Methuen, 1984); István Deák, Jan Tomasz Gross, and Tony Judt, eds., The Politics 
of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
35 Louis, Imperialism at Bay; John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405 
(London: Allen Lane, 2007), 470.
36 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contempo­
rary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
37 For a detailed history of the United Nations, see, for example, Evan Luard, A History of the United 
Nations (London: Macmillan, 1982); Alessandro Polsi, Storia dell’ONU (Rome: Laterza, 2006).
38 UN Charter, Preamble, www.un.org/en/sections/un­charter/un­charter­full­text/index.html.
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well as military means, and by encouraging the development of friendly 
and harmonious relations between its members. The charter outlined the 
various organs of the new organisation, including a General Assembly, a 
Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, 
an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
The UN Charter outlined a world order based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of its members; the constitutive unit of this world vi-
sion was the state as a self­ governing, independent, and autonomous pol-
ity. Regional organisations, such as unions or federations, were permitted, 
but not required for the functioning of the new international system.
However, the institutional design of the United Nations suggested that, 
in practice, not all member states were equal. The Security Council, which 
held ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’, included fifteen members, of which five were permanent. The 
permanent members of the council, China, France, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, held a veto right that endowed 
them with a privileged position within the nascent international order. The 
apparent equality of states was, in fact, a deeply hierarchical order aimed 
at defending the interests of the victors.39 The outsized role of a few states 
was not accepted without protest.40 It led many, including the Chicago con­
stitutionalists whom I discuss in chapter 6, to doubt that the new organisa-
tion could indeed set the foundation for a radically new world order, not 
infested with the faults of the League of Nations.
Chapter I of the charter reaffirmed the centrality of state sovereignty: 
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’. 
The emphasis on domestic sovereignty set a severe condition on the activ-
ities and jurisdiction of the new international organisation, in a way that 
many political commentators at the time found ineffective and counter-
productive. The UN Charter announced the creation of a new, long­ lasting 
international order; yet mid­ century globalists found it unsatisfac tory, and 
continued their quest for an alternative.
If the charter promoted the principle of state sovereignty, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights apparently embodied a commitment for 
universality and shared values. The declaration, proclaimed by the UN 
General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, was a significant land-
39 Mazower, Governing the World, 213.
40 A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European 
Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 264.
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mark in mid­ century debates on world order. Eleanor Roosevelt was a 
prominent member of the drafting committee, which included represen-
tatives from eight different countries.41 Building on ideas and draft bills 
provided by a variety of civil organisations and governments, the commit-
tee sought to form a universally consensual vision of human rights and 
their implementation in the post­ war order. As I demonstrate, the decla-
ration was one of many attempts to come to terms with the need to de­
fine the basic qualities of humanity that embodied entitlements to be 
respected and defended. Catholic scholars, global constitutionalists, and 
European federalists each had their own interpretation of the universal 
rights of humanity. The feeling of urgency that surrounded the drafting 
of the declaration reflected the wider mid­ century concern with the idea 
of human rights and their potential role in the new world order. Yet, as 
Samuel Moyn argued, the declaration ‘was less the annunciation of a new 
age than a funeral wreath laid on the grave of wartime hopes’.42 The mid­ 
century debate on order and rights was truncated by the Cold War.
The decisive geopolitical changes in the early 1950s set the temporal 
limits for this study. The rise of the Cold War mentality in the United 
States undermined the support for new schemes of global order, and ren-
dered many of these visions impractical.43 In American public debate, and 
to a lesser extent in Britain, the idea of globalism was overpowered by the 
idea of bipolarism. By the outbreak of the Korean War, imagining a new 
global order of the world seemed futile, and sometimes dangerously naïve.
Setting a precise time frame for an intellectual history embodies the risk 
of obfuscating important continuities and imposing anachronistic temporal 
divides. The spotlight on one decade should not become a rigid artificial 
constraint. On the one hand, this study constructs the 1940s as a coherent 
historical period, rather than as two half decades, divided by the world­ 
changing detonation of the atomic bomb in August 1945.44 On the other 
hand, it recognises evident overlaps and continuities with earlier and later 
modes of thinking about world politics, especially along the ‘transwar’ pe-
riod, stretching from 1930 to 1950.45
After 1950, the central themes of the globalist ideology of the previous 
decade did not completely disappear from political debate. Instead, the 
‘global’ space was marginalised, until its return to centre stage after 1989. 
41 On Eleanor Roosevelt and the declaration, see Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor 
Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2002).
42 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010), 2.
43 Campbell Craig, ‘The Resurgent Idea of World Government’, Ethics & International Affairs 22 (2008): 
133– 142.
44 William Graebner, The Age of Doubt: American Thought and Culture in the 1940s (Boston: Twayne, 
1993), 1.
45 Philip Nord, France’s New Deal from the Thirties to the Postwar Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2010), 12– 13.
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Today, globalism and globalisation embody important patterns of think­
ing about the spatiality of political and economic order.46 The processes of 
European integration and globalisation and the development of interna-
tional institutions including the United Nations and its agencies brought 
to the fore many questions about the desirable and viable spaces of poli-
tics that had already been discussed in the 1940s.47 Political philosophers 
today face, to a certain extent, similar challenges to the ones that daunted 
mid­ century thinkers, and seek to apply the same political categories— 
such as constitutionalism, federalism, and pluralism— to outline a solution. 
In this context, The Emergence of Globalism presents an archaeological ex-
cavation of unrealised plans, an investigation of past attempts to translate 
observations about the world into new forms of political order. The con-
temporary revival of the idea of the global provides another motivation for 
looking more closely at the rendering of global ideas by mid­ century pub-
lic intellectuals.
The 1940s should be understood, I suggest, not only against an analysis 
of historical events, but also against debates about globalism and world 
order that proliferated in the British and American public sphere during 
the decade. Scholarly literature on mid­ century political thought has been 
largely focused on the creation of international institutions and the hu­
man rights regime or on individual figures and political leaders of the 
time.48 However, as this book aims to show, without understanding the 
development of the discourse of globalism and the intellectual history of 
‘world order’, the history of twentieth­ century Western political thought 
remains incomplete.
In writings about world order during and immediately after the war, 
many political commentators embraced a degree of dynamism and insta-
bility as inherent in the new globality of politics. Yet these mid­ century 
representations of the concept of order have been downplayed by Interna­
tional Relations scholars who have delineated the foundational moments 
of their discipline.49 The conceptual tools provided by conventional his-
46 The relations between globalisation, history, and politics have been the subject of innumerable 
studies in various disciplines, including, for example, Yale H. Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones, eds., Politi­
cal Space: Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2002); John A. Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
47 There are many intellectual histories of the European Union. See, for example, Fabrizio Sciacca, 
ed., La dimensione istituzionale europea: teoria, storia e filosofia Politica (Florence: Le Lettere, 2009); Justine 
Lacroix and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, eds., European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
48 Recent publications include Mazower, Governing the World; Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the 
World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Moyn, Last 
Utopia. The UN Intellectual History Project similarly aims at expanding the historical scholarship about 
this organisation (www.unhistory.org).
49 A recent revisionist history of International Relations (IR) focuses on an earlier period; see Brian 
C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany: 
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torical accounts of international thought, exemplified by the paradigm of 
the debate between realism and idealism, can do little to explain the emer-
gence of globalism in mid­ century thought, when concerns about power, 
order, morality, and democracy were closely intertwined.50 In drawing on 
a wide range of intellectual sources, including science, law, religion, eco-
nomics, geopolitics, and ideology, the 1940s discourse on globalism was 
not confined by disciplinary boundaries and rigid paradigms. To explore 
the intellectual development of the idea of the global, one needs to cast a 
wider net.
The Ideologues of Globalism
Public intellectuals in the 1940s shared an awareness of the role of public 
debate in sustaining political change. If the war was fought for democracy, 
many thought that the post­ war order should be decided democratically 
through open debate in the public sphere, and not exclusively through 
parliamentary deliberations and diplomatic conferences. Thus, debate on 
world politics attracted many keen commentators who hoped to contrib-
ute to shaping the post­ war order by joining public conversations, if not by 
drafting concrete policy plans. Who were the participants in these conver-
sations, and why did they highlight the importance of the global political 
sphere? These were not secluded scholars, writing comfortably from their 
academic ivory towers. Rather, most of the figures examined in this book 
can be defined as public intellectuals, academically trained experts who en-
gaged in public debate in order to influence popular opinion and decision 
makers.51
State University of New York Press, 1998). Two recent accounts of the history of American IR explore 
mid­ century international thought without reference to the idea of the ‘global’; see Nicolas Guilhot, ed., 
The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference 
on Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power 
Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).
50 The classic version of this argument is Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919– 1939: An In­
troduction to the Study of International Relations (1939; repr., Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). For a revisionist 
history of the interwar discipline of IR, see Peter Wilson and David Long, eds., Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ 
Crisis: Inter­ war Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great 
Debate”  ’, Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 1– 16; Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where Are the Idealists 
in Interwar International Relations?’, Review of International Studies 32 (2006): 291– 308. On the interplay 
between intellectual history and IR, see David Armitage, ‘The Fifty Years Rift: Intellectual History and 
International Relations’, Modern Intellectual History 1 (2004): 97– 109; Duncan Bell, ‘Writing the World: 
Disciplinary History and Beyond’, International Affairs 85 (2009): 3– 22.
51 For definitions of the public role of intellectuals, see, for example, Cornelia Navari, Public Intellectu­
als and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 
2012), 1– 12; Julia Stapleton, Political Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2001); Stefan Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life 
in Britain 1850– 1930 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 1– 25.
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The ideologues of globalism at the centre of this study were predom-
inantly white male scholars who were privileged enough to be able to 
travel the world, lecture to educated audiences, and publish their ideas in 
widely read outlets. They invested considerable time and energy to gener-
ate public support for their ideas about world order.52 Nonetheless, there 
was no one authoritative version of the ‘global’ ideology, but rather there 
were many competing visions striving to attain political purchase and 
public support. In this context, I refer to the global ideologies as ‘clusters 
of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable 
groups, that provided directives, even plans, of action for public policy­ 
making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticise the social 
and political arrangements of a state or other political community’.53 With­
out committing themselves to a direct involvement in politics, the pro-
moters of the global ideologies considered their participation in public 
debate as a responsibility that came with their role as preeminent scholars 
in prestigious universities (although their main field of expertise was not 
always politics).
The elusiveness of the globalist agenda in the 1940s allowed a range 
of public intellectuals to participate in transnational debates on the desir-
able form and substance of the post­ war world order. These individuals 
came from different disciplinary and national backgrounds. They were re-
nowned scholarly experts in politics, sociology, law, economics, theology, 
philosophy of science, or geopolitics. While the conversations I explore in 
the book took place in Britain and the United States, some of the partic-
ipants were émigrés who had escaped political and racial persecution in 
their native countries, including Italy, France, Hungary, Austria, Germany, 
and Romania. Others were frequent travellers with expert knowledge of 
various parts of the world. Thus, the protagonists of this study represent, 
to a certain extent, diverse cultural, political, and geographic realities, 
which, I suggest, contributed to their particular attention to the global 
aspects of politics.
The rhetoric employed by these intellectuals was an essential part of 
their global visions since, for them, actualisation depended on popular 
consent.54 Their works aimed at a general audience that included but was 
52 Some of these authors may be considered ‘public moralists’, who, according to Stefan Collini, based 
their ideas on ethical arguments rather than expertise. Yet in the context of this study, I use the more 
flexible term ‘public intellectuals’ to describe individuals who engaged in public debate to promote both 
political and moral ends. Stefan Collini, Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007).
53 Michael Freeden, ‘Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy’, in Handbook of Political 
Theory, ed. Gerald Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage, 2004), 6.
54 For general accounts of the cultural and political roles of the public intellectual in the twentieth 
century, see Helen Small, ed., The Public Intellectual (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Richard A. Posner, Public 
Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
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not limited to politicians. Thus, political commentary meant engaging 
with the wider evils of their age rather than with specific problem solving. 
Many of these commentators saw their role in adapting generic theoret-
ical categories to their political reality. Their public authority depended 
on the ability to communicate effectively with their audience, through a 
variety of media: radio broadcasts, public meetings, speeches, pamphlets, 
newspapers and magazines, books, and scholarly articles.
The intellectuals I discuss in the book construct a loose network united 
by a shared concern with world order. This transnational Republic of 
Letters includes Raymond Aron, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, Lionel Cur-
tis, Friedrich Hayek, Owen Lattimore, Jacques Maritain, Richard McKeon, 
Charles E. Merriam, David Mitrany, Lewis Mumford, Michael Polanyi, Lio-
nel Robbins, Nicholas J. Spykman, Clarence Streit, Luigi Sturzo, H. G. Wells, 
and Barbara Wootton. This intellectual cohort is not a homogeneous group 
of thinkers adhering to a well­ defined ideology. Their interest in the global 
dimension of politics forms a bond of unity in diversity without giving rise 
to a dominant or representative political stance. This study outlines their 
relations, fleshing out points of agreement and divergence, in order to 
suggest the intellectual force of the discourse on globalism was its capacity 
to attract individuals of diverging worldviews, thus transcending many of 
the traditional classifications of political thought: liberals, socialists, Cath-
olics, radicals, conservatives, and atheists all found appeal in the promise 
of global order. 
Some of the book’s protagonists might be considered by historians as 
‘minor thinkers’ who lacked the intellectual stamina to develop philosophi­
cally sophisticated accounts. My aim is not to argue in favour of the  in­
clusion of these thinkers in any canon, nor to lament the neglect of some in 
standard treatments of the history of political thought. Other mid­ century 
international figures are doubtlessly no less deserving of the historian’s 
attention. I suggest, however, that the ‘great’ minds of political thought 
em body an exception rather than a representative example of the general 
trends of public debate. The intellectual sources for the emergence of glob­
alism as a political category are not necessarily confined to the publica-
tions of outstanding philosophers and brilliant theorists. Instead, I focus on 
the writings of a diverse group of scholars and commentators who actively 
engaged in transnational debates on world order and sought to influence 
public opinion on international affairs.
This book reconstructs the globalist conversations by interrogating the 
writings of a transnational network of intellectuals through their publica-
tions, speeches, and newspapers articles. This study has no pretence to pro-
vide a comprehensive or final assessment of mid­ century thought on world 
order. I make no attempt to gauge the popularity of various global schemes, 
their reception by the general public or politicians, and their political im-
plementation. Rather, I examine the contributions of public intellectuals to 
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shaping the idea of the global within the intellectual and political context 
of their times, employing a method inspired by Duncan Bell’s ‘hybrid con-
textualisation’.55 The detailed analysis of particular visions of world order 
provides a nuanced and complex account of the historical development of 
globalism during the 1940s. The wider thematic explorations of key theo-
retical perspectives on the ‘global’ serve to ground the individual visions in 
their intellectual, political, and cultural context.
Throughout the book, the personal and professional bonds between these 
thinkers will unfold. For example, Wells’s scientific internationalism was a 
source of inspiration for Aron, Merriam, and Polanyi.56 Wells sought advice 
from Wootton in writing his universal declaration of the rights of man.57 
He, like Mitrany, also participated in debates on federalism orchestrated by 
the British political organisation Federal Union, whose members included 
Wootton, Curtis, Robbins, and Hayek. Wootton and Curtis were colleagues 
at Chatham House, and met Lattimore at international conferences orga­
nised through the global network of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).58 
The correspondence between Curtis and Polanyi reveals their mutual inter-
est in world politics and faith.59 Hayek, Polanyi, and Aron met in 1938 at 
the Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris and kept in close touch in wartime 
London.60 Aron debated political Machiavellianism with Maritain, who, 
in turn, supported the global constitutionalism of Borgese and McKeon.61 
McKeon and Lattimore spoke in a panel on ‘Problems Arising from the Inter­ 
relations and Policies of the Great Powers’ at a conference on the develop-
ment of international society, held at Princeton University in 1946. Mum-
ford’s correspondence with Borgese dates back to their world constitution 
project of 1941, revealing a strong convergence of opinion on the future of 
democracy.62
The flexible network of political thinkers that I outline in this study 
serves to embed the emergence of globalism in the historical intellectual 
55 Bell, Idea of Greater Britain, 26.
56 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders (London: Routledge, 1951); Ray-
mond Aron (René Avord), ‘L’universalisme de Wells, Tribute to H. G. Wells on His 75th Birthday’, Adam: 
International Review 153 (1941): 6– 7; Charles E. Merriam, ‘Review of The New World Order by H. G. Wells’, 
American Journal of Sociology 46 (1940): 402– 403.
57 H. G. Wells, The Rights of Man: An Essay in Collective Definition (Brighton: Poynings Press, 1943).
58 For records of the Chatham House participation in the IPR conferences, see the Records of Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, box 6, folder 1.
59 Michael Polanyi to Lionel Curtis, 21 December 1944, Michael Polanyi Papers, Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library (hereafter MPP), box 4, folder 12.
60 Serge Audier, Le Colloque Lippmann: Aux origines du néo­ libéralisme (Lomont: Le Bord de l’Eau, 2008); 
Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).
61 Richard McKeon, ‘A Philosophy for UNESCO’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1948): 
573.
62 Herbert Agar et al., The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy (New York: Viking, 1941).
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fabric in which it developed.63 The political and philosophical founda-
tion of these intellectual exchanges is an underlying theme in the book, 
revealing the importance of this transnational Republic of Letters to the 
building of the interdisciplinary vocabulary of globalism.
Outline of the Book
The Emergence of Globalism explores the various facets of the theoretical 
discourse of the ‘global’ in mid­ century Britain and the United States, by un­
covering the political assumptions that motivated its proponents, examin-
ing the intellectual webs that linked advocates of globalism, reconstructing 
the cultural conventions that fashioned their ideas, and critically assess-
ing the rhetorical moves that they made. The book is a non­ chronological 
history, a thematic analysis of the diverse conversations in which global-
ism was developed and shaped.
Two arguments sustain the theoretical claims advanced in the individ-
ual thematic chapters of the book. First, the stimulus for thinking about 
world order and for imagining it as particularly ‘global’ rose from the per-
ception of epochal crisis that, for mid­ century intellectuals, conditioned 
their world. As I have suggested, the war generated a diffused awareness 
of the great uncertainty that undermined the foundations of human exis-
tence and political order alike. Disquiet about the prospects of democracy 
in Europe drove mid­ century public intellectuals to seek a more stable 
and resistant form of democratic order that could be applied globally. 
After the war, trust in international organisations was waning. The failure 
of the League of Nations to prevent war led many to doubt the new United 
Nations could operate more effectively. Visions of global order emerged 
as an attempt to provide a better response to confusion and turmoil.
The second argument is about change. Mid­ century thinkers identified 
the global as an innovative, indeed unprecedented condition of world pol-
itics. The crisis they diagnosed as the prime characteristic of their time 
embodied not only dangerous instability but also flux and fluidity that, for 
some, could lead to a positive change. Although visions of world order in 
the 1940s oscillated between ambitious schemes and minimalistic reforms, 
they shared a common perception of the unique opportunity warranted by 
the world­ changing war to refashion world order. Fear of world destruc-
tion by new weapons was accompanied by a cautious optimism about the 
63 Usually, the works of some of these thinkers were analysed separately, without reconstructing the 
intellectual conversations of which they were part. See, for example, Ian Hall and Lisa Hill, eds., British In­
ternational Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010); Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest, 
and Peter Wilson, eds., Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013); Kenneth W. Thompson, Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth- Century Theo­
rists and the World Crisis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980).
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possibility to construct a better political order in which liberty, diversity, 
and peace could be salvaged. The threat of war— and for some the po-
tential annihilation of humanity— endowed the mid­ century debate with 
a novel sense of urgency that had not characterised earlier international 
thought. Thus, the perception of global crisis and the sensibility of an un-
precedented opportunity for global change gave shape to many 1940s vi-
sions of world order.
The book is structured around the geopolitical and conceptual notion 
of political space, a wide theme that runs across the global visions I dis-
cuss. Concerns about the desirable spatial dimension of politics formed 
mid­ century globalism. Thus, the historical narrative I frame in this book 
seeks to reflect the centrality of spatiality for mid­ century thinkers. The 
chapters of the book are organised by spatial scale, progressing from the 
state to the region, the empire, the federation, and finally the universe. 
Each chapter examines how past authors reconceptualised different di-
mensions of political order in the context of the new framework offered 
by the global space.
Chapter 2 explores perceptions of the state in a global context, argu-
ing that the emergence of globalism encouraged mid­ century thinkers to 
reimagine— but not abandon— the nation­ state. My analysis explores Ray-
mond Aron’s writings during his wartime exile in London, most of which 
were published in the journal La France libre.64 Historians have downplayed 
the significance of Aron’s early writings on world politics and focused on 
his studies of international relations theory in the 1960s.65 Through an analy­
sis of his proposals to reinterpret the political space of the nation­ state in 
the post­ war era, however, I suggest that the war experience formed Aron’s 
con ceptualisation of international relations. While the state remained for 
Aron the main bastion of individual liberty, he acknowledged its conceptual 
and structural insufficiency in the age of globalism. Aron’s interpretation 
of political ideologies in conversation with the sociologist Karl Mannheim 
and the philosopher Jacques Maritain led to the development of his loose 
and pluralistic vision of European unity held together by ‘political myth’. A 
comparison between Aron’s vision of world order and that of David Mitrany 
reveals their shared concern with the need to embed the state in a new 
global context to guarantee its survival as a political unit in the post­ war era. 
Mitrany’s idea of functional relations and Aron’s political myth both served 
to reconceptualise the state in new global settings. I draw on the writings 
of E. H. Carr to demonstrate that Aron and Mitrany based their proposals 
64 Raymond Aron, Chroniques de guerre: La France libre: 1940– 1945, ed. Christian Bachelier (Paris: Galli­
mard, 1990).
65 Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann­ Lévy, 1962).
© Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be 
distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical 
means without prior written permission of the publisher. 
For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
INTRODUCTION • 21
on two very different interpretations of politics that rendered their global 
visions politically and intellectually incompatible.
Chapter 3 expands the spatial perspective from the state to the region. In 
the early 1940s American geopolitical thinkers used spatial concepts to out-
line the post­ war political map, and reimagine the role of the United States 
in it. Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and Isaiah Bowman had pioneered 
the study of the relations between geography and politics. Americans inter-
preted geopolitics as the dynamic, ever­ changing interaction between po-
litical government and natural geography. The chapter explores the notion 
of ‘dynamic geopolitics’ in the writings of two leading American geopoliti-
cians, Nicholas J. Spykman and Owen Lattimore. Their proposals for tripolar 
regional world order were grounded in empirical observations and com-
peting interpretations of world politics: Lattimore imagined a post­ imperial 
order based on a global pluralistic democracy, while Spykman wanted to 
establish the United States as a new player in a world order still organised 
by the precepts of empire. I analyse the key concepts in their geopolitical vi­
sions to distinguish their seemingly similar tripolar world orders, and reveal 
the conceptual centrality of ‘empire’ to their global thought. Finally, I ex-
plain the marginalisation of geopolitics in the post­ war American discipline 
of International Relations.
Chapter 4 returns to the problem of empires and their position in a new 
global order. It examines the notion of ‘democratic federalism’ through the 
story of the British organisation Federal Union. In this and the following 
chapter, I uncover an important change in the meaning of democratic fed­
eralism as the foundation of mid­ century global order. Originally, this struc-
ture was proposed as a solution to safeguard the declining British Empire, 
but by the end of the war it became part of a global scheme for socioeco-
nomic reform. The chapter examines the visions of democratic federalism 
promoted by Lionel Curtis and Clarence Streit, aimed at creating a dem-
ocratic world region based on the British Empire and the idea of Anglo­ 
American cultural supremacy. The discussions at Federal Union committees 
and in the organisation’s newsletter reflect the growing resistance to the 
imperial model of organising the global political space. Finally, the chapter 
reveals the limits of Federal Union’s approach to the European colonies and 
their future within the new federal system.
Chapter 5 traces a different debate on democratic federalism at Federal 
Union, which sought to overcome the legacy of empire by emphasising the 
economic and social emancipatory function of the democratic federation. 
I outline the rise of a new idea of democratic federalism that shifted from 
a constitutional structure to safeguard the declining British Empire to a 
regional scheme for socioeconomic change. This transition was shaped in 
debates among its members, including William Beveridge, Lionel Robbins, 
Barbara Wootton, and Friedrich Hayek, in Federal Union meetings and in 
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the pages of Federal Union News. This new conception of federalism hoped 
to meliorate individual social and economic living conditions through 
transnational unity. However, there was no clear consensus on the desir-
able and possible political strategies to bring about federal economic de-
mocracy, as Wootton and Hayek’s debate on free market and social plan-
ning demonstrated. This episode revealed the tensions between competing 
ideas of liberty and democracy, and their implications for global politics, 
anticipating some of the debates around the European Union.
Perceptions of federal world order are the theme of chapter 6, which 
shifts the spatial focus from the region to the whole world. I look at a 
group of American and European émigré intellectuals in the United States 
who formed the Chicago Committee to Frame a World Constitution (1945– 
1948). The committee, led by Robert M. Hutchins, Richard McKeon, and 
Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, united leading intellectuals and scholars con-
cerned with the crisis of world order after the atomic bomb. Theirs was a 
sustained intellectual attempt to delineate the theoretical foundations for 
a world federation and global government, and cement them in a consti-
tutional document.66 The constitution was, in Mark Mazower’s words, ‘a 
staggeringly implausible document’ that ‘sank almost without trace’.67 Yet 
the real contribution of the committee rests, I suggest, in the vast unpub-
lished documentation it has produced on key theoretical aspects of the new 
global condition of world politics like representation, political participa-
tion, and moral unity. I examine the theoretical contribution of this project 
to mid­ century conceptualisations of legal, political, and moral universal-
ism. The protagonists of this debate were the philosopher McKeon, who 
advanced a minimalist form of pluralistic universalism, and the anti­ fascist 
Italian literary critic Borgese, who proposed an all­ encompassing consti-
tution grounded in natural law and moral universalism. When Borgese’s 
version was accepted, McKeon retired from the committee and advanced 
his ideas at the UNESCO preparatory committee on human rights and de-
mocracy (1948). However, as the jurist Hans Kelsen noted in his comments 
on the constitution, by alienating the advocates of the pluralistic approach 
to world constitution the committee undermined the project’s feasibility.
Chapter 7 outlines the interplay of globalism and perceptions of science 
through a series of debates about the potential contribution of scientific 
practices and technological innovation to the conceptualisation of the 
global sphere. The atomic bomb presented a global threat that required, 
for many mid­ century commentators, a global solution. The bomb inten­
sified perceptions of the global impact of science and ignited public debate 
66 Robert Maynard Hutchins et al., Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948).
67 Mazower, Governing the World, 233.
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on its political implications. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists provided 
a platform for scientists and politics scholars to discuss world affairs. The 
chapter charts conversations about the place of science in global politics 
through the writings of four individuals: H. G. Wells, Charles E. Merriam, 
Michael Polanyi, and Lewis Mumford. Through this network of thinkers 
and publications, I explore how mid­ century perceptions of global order 
developed in debates on the philosophy of science, liberalism, individu-
alism, and morality. I examine the different roles assigned to experts and 
scientists in these global visions, and highlight the hidden assumptions 
about moral universalism that motivated them. Despite the universal as-
piration of these globalist proposals, their philosophical precepts were 
grounded in an implicit— sometimes explicit— defence of West ern civilisa-
tion, its moral values and political traditions.
Chapter 8 investigates how religious ideas shaped and constrained mid­ 
century theories of world order. The chapter revolves around Jacques Mari­
tain and Luigi Sturzo, who argued that Christianity— and especially Cathol­
icism— provided the theoretical toolkit for constructing a peaceful and 
prosperous post­ war order for individuals and communities. Charting their 
interactions with other protagonists of the book, including Raymond Aron, 
Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, and Reinhold Niebuhr, I discuss their support 
of federalism as a shape­ giving principle for the new order. While both 
drew on Catholic thought to theorise the various components of a desirable 
pluralist global order— persons, communities, the common good— their 
visions differed on a crucial point: the place of democracy in the global-
ist agenda. The chapter reveals the tensions between the particularistic, 
inherently Western Christian theological doctrines, and their attempted 
application as a conceptual foundation for a pluralistic yet united world 
order. I argue that Sturzo’s attachment to social Catholicism led his vi-
sion of global order away from the conservative stance that characterised 
Maritain’s proposals, towards a dialectical interpretation of politics. The 
concluding chapter ties together the various theoretical and historical nar-
ratives of global thought in the 1940s, and proposes some reflections on 
the decline of the globalist ideology at the end of the decade, and its om-
nipresent return at the end of the twentieth century.
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